Archives for posts with tag: skepticism

To understand postmodernism, one must first have a basic understanding of modernism. Luckily, modernism is far less complex than postmodernism, which hopefully makes understanding postmodernism easier as well. Modernism is a paradigm that says that we’ve figured everything out, science has won, our current institutions never need to change again, and any form of progress will only be the refinement of things that we currently have got going for us right now. It’s the paradigm of Fukuyama’s “End of History.” There’s no point in talking about things anymore; this is it.

Postmodernism is the reply to that which says, “Wellllllll….. I mean…. really? Literally everyone in the past has said that their way of thinking is irrefutably true, but you’re super sure that you’ve got it this time?”

This of course is completely reasonable. Modernists give primacy to science; science is about the refutation of existing theories (except apparently when it comes to the primacy of science and other modernist principles which can never possibly be refuted), so why is there such blowback against attempts to refute existing theories? Postmodernism is applying rational skepticism to firmly entrenched ideas and values. This is usually done by looking at an idea that is taken for granted as true, analyzing its history, and then pointing out flaws that have been imbued in that idea since its inception. Postmodernists usually leave it up to us to decide what to do with their criticism, but it’s generally assumed that a revaluation of that idea is the implied minimum.

For a couple of examples, capitalism is an economic system founded in colonialism and slavery. Tracing its history to today, one can see threads of that continuing in the exploitation of third world countries for first world profits. Postmodernism stops there. It has never been big on solutions, just pointing out the problems. I’ve also outlined the general thesis of Foucault’s evolution of punishment here. This blog is essentially a postmodern analysis of contemporary justice. Basically if you’re criticizing something by looking at how its history has shaped its current incarnation, you’re doing postmodernism. Nietzsche was actually one of the first postmodernists. In The Genealogy of Morals, he takes the firmly established Christian way of life, and then deconstructs it as the “slave morality” response to the Roman “master morality”, thus leading to the insipidness of his time. The difference I guess is that Nietzsche offered a solution.

Here’s the thing: nobody likes postmodernists. Which is weird because skepticism has been around for a looonnnng time. Postmodernists are attacked for not liking science and reason; David Hume posited that causality is unknowable; Renee Descartes suggested that mathematical truths could be the deception of an evil demon, and thus could not be held self-evident; Sextus Empiricus, one of the most famous Greek skeptics, provided proofs both for and against the gods; Socrates denied traditional piety, values, language, epistemology, justice… so many things. Much like Socrates, postmodernists get a lot of grief because they attack the paradigm of those in power. They are the gadflies of modernity.

If you watch any video on postmodernism, you’ll probably see somewhere in the comments advice from helpful Youtubers to check out Jordan Peterson, because he knows about postmodernism, and he says it’s bad. Let’s look at some of his criticisms:

It’s an attack on rationality/empiricism/science: That’s one way of framing it, sure, but that isn’t unprecedented even in the most enlightened of circles, and it’s not actually the case. Postmodernism appreciates other ways of knowing, rather than baldly accepting the deification of reason. Maybe beauty has some truth worth knowing, or empathy might reveal something about the universe. Ask yourself, “How can I prove that reason is the ultimate way of knowing?” You can answer either with reason, which would lead to an infinite regress (proving reason with reason would require further reason to prove the second reason), or with some other way of knowing, which shows the value of an alternative. It’s not that science is wrong or bad, it’s that it’s not alone.

It suggests multiple viewpoints, which means there can be no true viewpoint. The only reason we have an agreed upon viewpoint is because it belongs to those in power: Well, yeah. Read a book. History belongs to the victors, right? Those with the most power are going to organize things so that they keep winning. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure that out. Everyone knows politicians are corrupt because they do everything to keep their power, but nobody can make the leap to other facets of our society functioning on the same premise? Please.

Next would be the relativism implied in the criticism: the difficulty we have with truth does not mean that there cannot be a best viewpoint, and deciding which is best is a lot more complicated than accepting the current system simply because that’s the way it has always been. Perhaps with a postmodern lens, we can better understand which viewpoint has the greatest benefit.

There is no individual in postmodernism, just identity. It splits people into an oppressor and oppressed class: Again, yes. Economists and statisticians split people into identifiable variables all the time. It makes measuring trends easier. It’s a way of analyzing social phenomena. If one group is lumped together into an oppressor class, that’s because historically that group has tended to behave in that pattern and now benefits from that history, even if you don’t accept that that practice continues today. It’s not complicated.

Postmodernists are all Marxists. They don’t engage in dialogue. They want to destroy everything: To sum up, postmodernism corrupts the youth. Peterson is famous for wanting to shut down university courses that he believes perpetuate postmodern ideas and “cultural Marxism.” This is the exact charge the Athenians levied against Socrates. There is a lot of propaganda against postmodernists by those who stand to lose under their dissecting eye. Peterson is a buffoon.

There are some valid criticisms of postmodernism, even in this blog. You may have noticed I repeatedly pointed out that it doesn’t offer solutions. Beyond this, it denies any Grand Narrative, which in theory could be used to unify people even if today they are mostly used for jingoist purposes. When people call postmodernism a philosophy I usually cringe because I see it more as sociology rather than philosophy. A postmodernist is more likely to criticize bourgeois philosophy than participate within it, and fair enough.

The true skeptic holds that every belief must be questioned, including the belief that every belief must be questioned. Postmodernism is not beyond criticism, and nobody says it should be. It’s just that too much of its criticism has been coming from people who lump it in with “Cultural Marxism“, and those people are just so, so dumb and are ruining things for everyone. I just want to go back to writing about how empathy isn’t real and the Marxist implications of Facebook, but NOOOOooooo! I have to write out entire blogs explaining why alt-right talking points are wrong.

Post-script: In that Jordan Peterson video, he says that he read Foucault’s Madness and Civilization, and then says that its theme is that the presentation of mental illness is shaped by the conditions of its surrounding environment. That’s… not what the book is about at all. The book is about showing how mental illness is framed in moral terms, as a manifestation of an unreason contrasting the social norms of its environment. Kind of like how being transgender is seen as morally deviant because it flies in the face of the traditional understandings of gender. It’s actually exactly like that. Peterson either never actually read the book and is posturing (so smugly) to seem smart to his followers, or he’s just really, really dumb and didn’t pick up what Foucault wrote out explicitly like, a bunch of times throughout the book. It really seems to me that Jordan Peterson learned about postmodernism from a Jordan Peterson video, and didn’t investigate further because whatever, he gets to be famous for being the stupid man’s smart person.

One of the things people care about more than anything else in the world is ancient Greek philosophy. At parties, the person surrounded by the most rapt of audiences is the one describing their perspective on Epicureanism and its virtuous hedonism. Pestering a first date like a gadfly, inquiring into the nature of justice, is a surefire way to get them to suggest you drink hemlock; a celebratory homage to the father of Western philosophy, and a guaranteed second date if you can survive the hemlock. These are all true facts, but how did I learn that they are true facts? This is my very clever segue into Meno’s paradox, a conundrum spoken by Meno in Plato’s dialogue, the Meno.

If you know something, inquiry is unnecessary. If you don’t know something, inquiry is impossible. We can’t seek out something we don’t know about, and why would we bother trying to learn about something we already know? For example, if you didn’t know that Socrates was condemned to death for impiety and corrupting the youth, and willingly drank the poisonous hemlock as an act of defiance against willful ignorance, then how would you ever learn? Especially if you didn’t even know who Socrates was? Alternatively, since we’re all eager amateur historians of philosophy here, and you have a full understanding of the political embarrassment Socrates caused the powerful Athenian elites which contributed to his execution, then you reading all this again is redundant and pointless.

And yet, if you didn’t know, you have now learned these things. How on Earth did you resolve the paradox? Of course, maybe I lied or was too convoluted in my explanation, and you have come away with an imperfect belief. Or maybe history is hard to translate after 2500 years and some details are surely lost to the point where any story about the life of Socrates is essentially fiction. How do you know?

Plato’s solution is a theory of recollection. Human beings possess eternal souls, and being eternal, have an omniscient understanding of the universe. We know things because when we reflect on a subject, we can acquire a fraction of the infinite understanding that has a certain feel of knowledge that separates it from belief. However, I expect that there are fewer of you who would authentically subscribe to a dead mythology than who would willingly accept the inherent sexiness of Greek philosophy, so we’ll have to do better than that.

Plato’s theory is not entirely ridiculous, and instinctual knowledge, such as a baby knowing to suckle when things are put into its mouth, could be interpreted as biological memory of evolutionary development. Our primal drives are not learned in the traditional sense, but acquired through the collective mode of our very being. This kind of knowledge, however, does not include much of what we consider worth knowing.

There are actually eight ways of knowing with varying degrees of credibility relative to the infinite wisdom of an eternal soul: language, sense perception, emotion, reason, imagination, faith, intuition, and memory. Let’s go through them to see how we know what we know.

Language: You are reading this and possibly learning things based entirely on your ability to understand language. The words we have represent things in the world, and being able to name a thing or a concept allows us to discuss it. Of course, language is complicated, subjective, socially constructed and ultimately ambiguous in its communication (think of how many text messages are misconstrued because of their foundation grounded solely in language).

Sense perception: If you think about it, the only way you’re even able to read these words is because you have working eyeballs or maybe you’re listening to this on a text-to-speech program. We intake worldly experiences through our senses: taste, hearing, sight, smell, touch, and seeing dead people. Now, the senses are heavily flawed and human beings are rubbish at sensory input compared to other animals, so typically we utilize the sensory input of others to verify whether our perceptions are real or imagined. The addition of intrinsically flawed data does not seem to be the best format for gaining knowledge and really sounds more like it would compound the problem rather than ameliorate it, so let’s keep going.

Emotion: I’m following a list given by this website, so if you’re wondering why I just went from one of the most defensible positions in the accumulation of knowledge to probably one of the least, that’s why. When we experience an event, we typically respond emotionally to it, giving us an impression of how that event relates to us. However, let’s think about the movie What Dreams May Come. It’s a movie that moved me deeply, but those emotions are based entirely on a fiction. The reality of that film was actors in a studio surrounded by lights, cameras, microphones, and dozens of people bustling about to create that fiction. My emotional response is so far gone from the reality of what actually was happening in What Dreams May Come that to credit it as an indicator of knowing something about the world is absurd. My emotional response is going to be my interpretation about what is presented directly toward me, regardless of the inner contexts that might be contributing to that presentation. Also there is bias, subjectivity, etc. etc. It is a bad way to know things, is what I’m driving at.

Reason: There are two types of reason: deductive and inductive. Deductive reasoning is A=B, B=C, therefore A=C.  So, for example, all dogs have fur, Rex is a dog, therefore Rex has fur. This method of logic is entirely based on the veracity of its premises. Another example: all pit bulls are vicious, Rex is a pit bull, therefore Rex is vicious. This is valid based on the premises, but how do we know about the premises? #NotAllPitBulls. Induction is coming to a conclusion based on the repetition of observations; A has always appeared to lead to B, therefore A causes B. So dogs have fur (based on the social understanding of what ‘dog’ means) because every instance of a dog I’ve seen before has fur. You’ll notice that reason is heavily influenced by the already discussed, incredibly fallible empiricism of the senses. In addition, it is a shaky assumption that just because something has happened before it necessarily must happen again. This comic does a good job of looking at reason as a way of knowing, and has the line, “If man had not first experienced the sky, he never could have deduced the clouds from nothing!” which again shows how dependent reason is on the senses for its viability as a way of knowing.

Imagination: The explanation given for this one is if we think of a lemon or a lime, we can imagine what each tastes like and then infer which is more sour. This creates sensation without the sensory input. Alternatively, there is propositional imaginings, where one can imagine scenarios and infer information based on those imaginings. I mean, I guess this is kind of a knowledge, but it’s speculation based on memory at best, and not really a true way of knowing.

Faith: This is really just an extreme form of belief. I don’t know why they included it since knowing by definition is antithetical to faith.

Intuition: Intuition would be interesting to consider under a mythological pretext that I’m sure Plato would enjoy discussing, but the current common consensus is that what we know as intuition is the observations of our subconscious recognizing trends in the world and suggesting them to our brain before we consciously can perceive anything. Somehow I doubt that our subconscious observations are much better than our conscious ones, as they are still relying on sensory input, so unfortunately gut feelings aren’t all that great at being a way of knowing either.

Memory: The definition given by my go-to website here defines memory as “the faculty which allows us to retain information and reconstruct past experiences.” This is obviously a better definition than what I would have given as, “the tool with which we remember things we already knew.” My definition is a redundant way of knowing, and the website’s definition is probably worse since it is reconstructing past experiences, which in turn further degrades the already imperfect, original sensory input.

Holy fuck that was exhausting. Plus, we have even more problems than flawed ways of knowing. When I described language, your first thought was surely, “If language is subjective and socially constructed, then how do we even know what we mean when we say the word knowledge?” And you’d be absolutely correct. What is it to know something? Commonly, we interpret knowledge as a justified true belief. Knowledge is believing something based on some degree of evidence that matches with the reality of the world. Sounds legit. Enter Edmund Gettier.

The Gettier Problem is more thematic than specific, and it asks us to consider a shepherd who looks out at a hill and sees his sheep. However, this is actually a dog that looks like a sheep from afar, and isn’t his sheep at all. His sheep is on the other side of the hill, just out of view. This farmer may believe that his sheep is on the hill, which is as justified based on his observations and is indeed true, but his knowledge is still based on a falsity. Or a person who looks at a clock, sees that it is 2 o’clock at a time when it is indeed two o’clock, but does not realize that the clock had stopped exactly 12 hours earlier. Gettier’s actual problem is quite silly compared to these more reasonable ones, even though it still carries the main thrust of the argument. Here it is just so you can have a laugh:

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
Smith’s evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job

So not only are all the ways of knowing flawed in some fundamental way, but knowledge itself is indistinguishable from falsehood given the proper circumstances. This is all the more apparent when we consider the contrasting sources of knowledge that one can acquire via their Facebook newsfeed.  This Wall Street Journal algorithm pits the two realities of democrats and republicans against one another to show just how different they are. The bubbles we create around ourselves only feed us one side of the story, and when falsity stands side by side with reality, identical in every appearance, even without the purposefully fake news stories we still can only ever be uncertain about our knowledge and how we attained it, lest we fall victim to blind dogmatism.

So how do we get from one end of Meno’s Paradox to the other? We don’t, it seems. The best we can hope for is to continue learning, remaining skeptical of our own ideologies, open to new avenues of thought because being certain only proves our ignorance.

Lying is almost universally condemned as immoral behaviour. Deceiving children doubly-so. Yet for some reason, the lie of Santa Claus is celebrated every Christmas as children worship at the tabernacle of St. Nick, and parents knowingly smile and take joy in the deliberately perpetuated naivety of their offspring. Surely there must be a reason to pull the wool over the eyes of the young.

It would be nice to believe we lie for the sake of a lesson in post-modern deconstruction: the true nature of an old white man literally at the top of the world enforcing nonspecific yet absolute moral conventions is a social construction, and when children become disillusioned to the lie that is Santa Claus, they can become aware of the further social constructions of the dominant discourse in our society. Unfortunately, this inevitably leads to children thinking for themselves, and so this method is discarded as anarchical.

Many people believe that childhood is a time of innocence and joy, and that a belief in Santa Claus is a reflection of that innocence. The world is shitty and bleak, and children are not to be exposed to its true nature until they’re old enough to handle the responsibility that the misery of our inherited existence imposes upon them. Is this to protect them? Are we suggesting that joy cannot exist outside of a world built on lies? That innocence cannot survive when it is exposed to the truth? To believe this is to be a greater pessimist than those who choose not to lie to their children about Santa Claus, and those people are monsters.

When I was a child and suffered through my own carefree joy, I asked my mother if she believed in Santa Claus. She told me she believed in the spirit of Santa Claus. Though she didn’t elucidate at the time and I certainly didn’t know what elucidate meant in order to ask, what she meant was that there isn’t necessarily a being that delivers presents on a sleigh pulled by flying reindeer, but there is an essence of unlimited generosity that permeates the world once a year that is reflective of the nature of Santa Claus. People become more giving, human connection is enhanced, and the world becomes a better place, if only for one month out of the year. To her, this was Santa Claus. Perhaps we lie because children in their ignorance can more fully embrace this essence due to their unencumbered faith in jolly ol’ St. Nick.

Does the lie beget the symbol? Santa Claus in his current incarnation is notoriously based on an advertising campaign from Coca-Cola. His generosity is shown solely through his dispersal of material ‘things’ rather than intangible yet genuine human connection. Children cannot possibly understand this as a symbol of giving, because they are only ever on the receiving end. Does our lie not teach children that generosity, love, and human connection are about the transaction of objects? That our gratitude should be given to an unknowable deity rather than the very real human beings who loves us with all their heart? That happiness is about receiving unearned material wealth? If we desire a symbol for unlimited generosity and kindness, we can do better than one of commercialized consumption and misplaced gratitude. Which, if you ask anybody who has worked in retail around the holidays, is in fact the modern spirit of Christmas.

So life is shit, and Santa Claus is more of a reflection of that than we might ever actually care to admit. So why do we lie? I think it’s because we want to believe in magic. When we are children, anything is possible: reindeer can fly, a guy who’s built like a dump truck can fit through itty-bitty chimneys, red and white are somehow fashionable… When anything is possible, hope and wonder trump sarcastic cynicism every time. We feel as adults that magic dies with youth, and that merely implausible impossibilities become statically impossible and futile to resist. We desperately want life to be better, and magic would simplify that to easily attainable.

As many point out with derision, Christmas is an appropriation of the pagan winter solstice festival, and Jesus was more likely born in September. Why then the association with the winter solstice? The shortest day of the year inevitably leads to longer and brighter days; the birth of the saviour marks the end of darkness and entails an increasingly brighter outlook for humanity. Christmas, as it were, is the celebration of hope for a better future. The essence of magic as a symbol for hope is what Christmas is all about; not gifts or generosity at all, but magic. In the spirit of Christmas, rather than seek magic in our own lives, we pass the torch to our young out of nostalgia before we inevitably extinguish it for them as well. Hope becomes fantasy as we purge ourselves of our childhood delusions, and we choose to accept bitter reality over a world with brightness. Santa Claus isn’t a lie, Santa Claus is dead. Santa Claus remains dead. And we have killed him.